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Abstract 
We link genetic diversity in the country of origin of the firms’ board members with corporate 
performance via board members’ nationality. We hypothesize that our approach captures 
deep-rooted differences in cultural, institutional, social, psychological, physiological, and 
other traits that cannot be captured by other recently measured indices of diversity. Using a 
panel of firms listed in the North American and U.K. stock markets, we find that adding 
board directors from countries with different levels of genetic diversity (either higher or 
lower) increases firm performance. This effect prevails when we control for a number of 
cultural, institutional, firm-level, and board member characteristics, as well as for the 
nationality of the board of directors. To identify the relationship, we use as instrumental 
variables for our diversity indices the migratory distance from East Africa and the level of 
ultraviolet exposure in the directors’ country of nationality. 
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1. Introduction 
How does genetic diversity in the country of origin of a firm’s board members affect the 
corporate performance of this firm? The answer has important implications for the optimal 
synthesis of corporate boards of directors as a means to enhance firms’ profitability and 
value. Human genetic diversity can be seen as an overall measure of diversity that captures 
differences in deep-rooted social, cultural, psychological, physiological, and institutional 
characteristics that were shaped many years ago. Thus, within-board differences in these 
characteristics—which modern relevant indices may fail to capture—can have a unique 
bearing on firm performance. In this study, we explore this hypothesis by bringing together 
data on the intra-population genetic variation in the country of origin of the firms’ board 
members along with simple measures of corporate performance.  
 To construct our genetic diversity related measure of board heterogeneity, we use 
information from BoardEx on the nationality of board members for a number of firms and 
attach the country-specific values of intra-population genetic diversity from Ashraf and Galor 
(2013a) to each board member. Then, we calculate a firm-year measure of board 
heterogeneity as the standard deviation of the Ashraf and Galor (2013a) values assigned to 
each board member in a given firm and year. For simplicity, and to avoid confusion with 
other measures of board heterogeneity that we use as control variables, we call this 
computation the “deviation effect” of genetic diversity or the genetic diversity related score 
of board heterogeneity.1 With this measure, we aim to examine whether including directors 
from countries with different levels of genetic diversity affects firms’ profitability and value. 
We are of course unaware about which genes these directors carry, and we do not claim to 
examine the direct effect of genomes on corporate performance. As discussed in Ashraf and 
Galor (2012) their measure of intra-population genetic diversity should be interpreted as “a 
                                                 
1 We use the two terms interchangeably in the rest of the manuscript.  
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proxy (i.e., a correlated summary measure) for diversity amongst individuals in a myriad of 
observable and unobservable personal traits that may be physiological, behavioral, socially-
constructed, or otherwise” (p. 2).2 Within this context, we hypothesize that diversity among 
these characteristics may result in board members that have, among other things, developed 
different perspectives, skills, and abilities that allow them to interpret and solve problems 
differently. In turn, this board heterogeneity could lead to different outcomes in terms of firm 
performance.  
We also abstain from suggesting that a higher or a lower level of diversity in the 
country of origin is either beneficial or unfavorable for corporate performance. Thus, we do 
not relate corporate performance to the mean score of genetic diversity in the boardroom. 
What we examine with the standard deviation is whether and to what extent deep-rooted 
differences in the directors’ countries of origin affect firm performance, irrespective of 
whether these differences come from a genetically more robust (less diverse) country or less 
robust (more diverse) country. After all, theory suggests that, under certain conditions, groups 
of diverse problem solvers can outperform groups of high-ability problem solvers (Hong and 
Page, 2004). Thus, we contend that it is the diversity in the aforementioned deep-rooted 
elements that shapes firm performance in unique ways.  
As an example, consider a U.K.-based firm with 10 directors, 8 of whom are British, 1 
is Brazilian, and 1 Italian. The British directors are all assigned an equal score of B, the 
standard deviation of which is zero. Based on Ashraf and Galor (2013a), the Brazilian 
director carries a score lower than B and the Italian a score higher than B. The presence of 
both the Brazilian and the Italian director increases the deviation of the board’s diversity. We 
seek to examine whether and to what extent this increase affects corporate performance. We 
                                                 
2
 In another study, Ashraf and Galor (2013b) provide evidence that genetic diversity is an underlying cause of a 
broad spectrum of existing manifestations of ethnic and cultural fragmentation.  
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are not considering whether the fact that the Brazilian (Italian) director has a score lower 
(higher) than B affects corporate performance. 
We test the impact of the deviation effect on firm performance, as measured by risk-
adjusted returns and Tobin’s q, using a panel of up to 1,085 firms based predominantly, but 
not exclusively, in the United States and the United Kingdom from 1999 through 2012. We 
overcome the potential endogeneity problem by using two instrumental variables. These 
variables are constructed using the migratory distance from East Africa and the ultraviolet 
exposure in the board members’ country of origin, by firm and year. Our exploration of these 
variables is motivated by the implications of Ashraf and Galor (2013a) as well as important 
findings in biology. 
Our results show that genetic diversity in the board members’ country of origin plays 
an important role in affecting corporate performance. This finding holds even if we control 
for numerous other elements of diversity, such as gender, trust, culture, and nationality, 
which have been shown to have an important bearing on the efficiency and performance of 
corporate boards and firms. In keeping with the results of Ashraf and Galor (2013a) regarding 
the effect of genetic diversity on economic development, we suggest that deep-rooted 
elements of diversity exist that were determined thousands of years ago and now play an 
important role in the functioning and performance of corporate groups. 
More specifically, we find that the deviation effect of genetic diversity is positive and 
statistically and economically significant. For a firm with an average risk-adjusted return, a 
one standard deviation increase in board heterogeneity, with regard to the genetic diversity in 
the board members’ country of origin, implies a 20.8% increase in risk-adjusted return. Also, 
an increase in the deviation of diversity by the same amount will increase Tobin’s q by 
approximately 6.9% for a firm with an average Tobin’s q in our sample. This positive effect 
on corporate performance is in line with an important strand of sociology and management 
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literature, which posits that the performance of groups is enhanced only when the level of 
heterogeneity is considerable and irrespective of whether the country of origin has a higher or 
a lower score compared to the country in which the firm is headquartered. We view this as an 
important finding with specific implications for organizational science, management science, 
and financial economics. 
In Section 2, we bring together the literature on the effect of various forms of 
diversity and group performance with the literature on genetic diversity and macroeconomic 
development. In Section 3, we discuss our data set, and in Section 4, we present our empirical 
findings and discuss our findings in relation to our theoretical background. In Section 5, we 
conclude by summarizing our main findings and providing directions for future research. 
 
2. Theoretical Considerations and Motivation 
The potential nexus between diversity in the boardroom and corporate performance is rooted 
in two distinct literatures, one initiated by sociologists and management scientists and another 
by economists. The seeds of the relevant literature can be traced at least as far back as Blau’s 
(1960, 1977) work on social integration and heterogeneity in groups in the form of cultural, 
gender, and racial heterogeneity. These theories, further refined in the management science 
literature by Earley and Mosakowski (2000), among others, hypothesize that diversity can 
exert both positive and negative influences on the performance of groups of individuals.  
The negative effects of increasing diversity (positive effects of homogeneity) emerge 
from the fact that communication in homogenous groups is facilitated by the group members’ 
common backgrounds, shared ideas and perceptions, and ease of interaction. In contrast, 
moderate levels of diversity can yield a segmented working environment between a small 
number of groups (usually two), which can lead to social barriers within a race-, gender-, or 
culture-based group. In turn, these processes can hinder an organization’s ability to function 
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efficiently by increasing communication problems and reducing organizational fairness. This 
idea is recognized in a number of related studies under the specter of the social identity 
theory (Smith et al., 1994; Lau and Murnighan, 1998; Dumas, Phillips, and Rothbard, 2013). 
The view of within-group diversity is, however, completely different in the sociology 
and management literature. Blau (1977) suggests that a high degree of group heterogeneity 
can effectively weaken social barriers as a result of more even diffusion of diversity within 
the groups. Under this diffusion mechanism, positive forces of diversity will surface that can 
be explained by the value-in-diversity hypothesis. In the words of Swann et al. (2004), 
combining the different ideas, knowledge, and skills of different cultures greatly enhances the 
potential for creative synthesis. In an interesting variation on this concept, Watson, Kumar, 
and Michaelsen (1993) suggest that these positive effects require some cooperative time 
before being realized, about four months.  
These theories imply that organizational groups composed of members with several 
different nationalities will benefit from prosperous interactions, heightened cooperation, and 
improved outcomes. In contrast, in moderately diverse groups in which only a few 
nationalities are represented, the barriers to interaction and cooperation are expected to be 
high. We highlight here, however, that the elements of diversity introduced in this study go 
beyond board members’ cultural, racial, and gender characteristics to encompass other, more 
general traits. It is here that the economics literature comes into play.  
Economics literature has examined the nexus between genetic diversity and 
performance-related outcomes from a macroeconomic perspective to analyze the historical 
sources of different countries’ economic development. The novelty of this literature is that it 
refers for the first time to genetic diversity, as opposed to cultural, racial, and other types of 
human diversity. The main contribution comes from the work of Ashraf and Galor (2013a) on 
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the “out of Africa hypothesis,” as well as from the “diffusion of development” hypothesis of 
Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009).  
The underlying premise of these hypotheses is that variation of migratory distance 
from East Africa—the site of origin for modern humans—to global settlements around the 
world enhanced biological differences among people. In turn, these biological differences 
gave rise to differences in behavior among inhabitants of the new settlements, which have 
had a significant effect on economic development of nations above and beyond differences in 
culture, institutions, geography, fractionalizations, and the like. These collective genetic traits 
were determined not by the relatively recent cultural differences among peoples but rather 
tens of thousands of years ago. 
Ashraf and Galor (2013a) find a hump-shaped effect of genetic diversity on 
comparative economic development. In our context, it is crucial to consider the positive and 
negative forces of genetic diversity on economic development. The positive forces relate to 
the beneficial effect of heterogeneity of individuals in expanding the production possibility 
frontier. The genetic heterogeneity of individuals captures traits that are not necessarily 
related to cultural, institutional, or other sociological characteristics but rather relate to other, 
deeper-rooted elements of individuals’ personality. The proposition is that it is precisely these 
differential elements that can bring new ideas and perspectives in the work environment, and 
they can also promote the synthesis of these ideas through individuals’ complementary traits. 
In turn, these positive forces lead to firms’ technological advancements and product 
innovation, improved operating efficiency, easier expansion abroad, and superior overall 
performance. 
Increasing heterogeneity in terms of the genetic diversity in the board members’ 
country of origin comes with costs, however, similar to those highlighted by the sociology 
and management literature. Specifically, it could enhance confusion and mistrust, which can 
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adversely affect the efficiency of decision-making and can increase organizational and 
operational risk. Higher diversity can, therefore, be linked to increased operating inefficiency, 
lower productivity, and inferior performance. These processes are also well documented in 
the biology literature under the impulse of the Darwinian kin selection theory as refined by 
Hamilton (1987) for human social patterns. This theory posits that altruistic and cooperative 
acts manifest themselves better in situations where individuals share common traits, leading 
to shared developmental environments, familiarity, and social bonding. Inevitably, this relates 
to the “selfish gene” theory of evolution proposed by Dawkins (1976).  
The sociology and management literature suggests that various forms of diversity can 
produce both positive and negative effects for corporate performance, while the economics 
literature introduces genetic diversity as a very important factor in shaping macroeconomic 
development. The extent to which genetic diversity in the origin countries of the board 
directors shapes corporate performance is the novel element we introduce into the 
intersection between diversity and corporate performance. 
 
3. Data 
Our data come from three different sources. The data used to construct our genetic diversity 
related score of board heterogeneity are from Ashraf and Galor (2013a). The data on firms’ 
corporate governance characteristics are from BoardEx, and the data on firms’ financial 
characteristics are from Thomson Reuters’ Worldscope and Datastream. We explicitly define 
all variables used in our study in Table 1 and provide summary statistics in Table 2. After 
cleaning up some data with missing observations for the main variables used in our analysis, 
we are left with a sample with a maximum of 4,198 observations from 1,085 firms during the 
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period 1999 through 2012.3 These firms are listed on either the London Stock Exchange or a 
North American stock exchange, and they are headquartered in one of 10 countries.4 
[Inset Tables 1 and 2 about here] 
We measure firm performance with a ratio of risk-adjusted returns (equivalent to the 
Sharpe ratio) and Tobin’s q (see, e.g., Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Dushnitsky and Lenox, 
2006). We view these two measures as complementary.5 The first ratio measures firms’ ex 
post performance and, relative to the simple return on assets, it includes the opportunity cost 
of the risk associated with holding the assets or generating the return. This adjustment is 
important because it scales the three-year average in the return on assets with the equivalent 
variance, providing a book-value equivalent to the Sharpe ratio. Tobin’s q is a future-oriented 
and risk-adjusted performance measure, reflecting the premium that the capital market will 
pay for a given level of firm assets. Given that we have a small difference in the number of 
observations between the risk-adjusted returns and Tobin’s q, we report in Table 2 the 
descriptive statics for the two panels separately.  
 
3.1. Estimating the genetic diversity related measure of board heterogeneity 
To construct our measure of board heterogeneity with respect to genetic diversity in the board 
members’ country of origin, we rely heavily on data from Ashraf and Galor (2013a). In their 
study on the “out of Africa” hypothesis, the authors construct an index of country-specific 
genetic diversity scores based on data from the HGDP-CEPH Human Genome Diversity Cell 
                                                 
3 All firms included are non-financial firms. We exclude financial firms from our sample because of the special 
features and special regulations imposed on these firms, which could bias the results. 
4 The vast majority of firms in our sample have headquarters in either the United Kingdom or the United States. 
For example, in the sample with Tobin’s q as the dependent variable, 460 firms are headquartered in the United 
Kingdom and 605 are in the United States. The remaining firms are headquartered in Bermuda, Canada, the Isle 
of Man, Jersey, Netherlands, Ireland, South Africa, or Switzerland. Naturally, the majority of firms in our 
sample have directors who are mostly (if not entirely) from the country in which the firm is headquartered. The 
mean deviation of diversity is 0.011 in the case of the U.K. firms, 0.006 in the case of the U.S. firms, and 0.022 
for the remaining firms. 
5 Dybvig and Warachka (2014) criticize Tobin’s q on the basis that scale inefficiency resulting from 
underinvestment lowers firm performance but increases Tobin’s q. This is a reason we more eclectically view 
our two measures of firm performance as complementary. 
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Line Panel and the framework of Ramachandran et al. (2005). Ashraf and Galor (2013a) offer 
a very diligent discussion about constructing this variable, and to avoid replicating this 
discussion here, we kindly refer the reader to their article.  
 Here we highlight the fact that population geneticists typically measure the extent of 
diversity in genetic material across individuals within a given population (such as an ethnic 
group) using an index called expected heterozygosity. This index reflects the probability that 
two individuals, selected at random from the relevant population, are genetically different 
from one another. The data used to construct the index of expected heterozygosity are based 
on allelic frequencies—that is, the frequency with which a gene variant or allele occurs in the 
population sample. Given allelic frequencies for a particular gene or DNA locus, geneticists 
compute the gene-specific heterozygosity statistic, which, when averaged over multiple genes 
or DNA loci, yields the overall expected heterozygosity for the relevant population.  
Based on Ashraf and Galor’s (2013a) country-level data, we calculate the standard 
deviation by firm-year of genetic diversity across the country-specific values given to each 
board member in our dataset. More formally, we consider the following measure:  
𝜎 = √
1
𝑛
∑ (𝑑𝑖 −𝑚)2
𝑛
𝑖=1 ,          (1) 
where σ is the standard deviation of the genetic diversity score d attached to the n board 
directors of each firm. Each director’s genetic diversity score is linked to the country of 
nationality i of that director, and m is the mean score of each board. We call the potential 
effect of this variable the deviation effect of genetic diversity in the directors’ country of 
origin on corporate performance. 
 Thus, this measure shows how diverse a board is with respect to the genetic diversity 
in the origin countries of its members. Consider for example a firm based in the United States 
that consists of 10 board directors, 8 of whom are American, 1 British, and 1 Argentinean. 
The American directors all carry a score approximately equal to 0.63, the British 0.73, and 
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the Argentinean 0.57. The deviation of diversity for this board equals 0.037, whereas it would 
equal zero if this was an all-American board, 0.031 if there were no Argentinean director, and 
0.019 if there were no British director.  
 We note three interrelated issues. First, we attach the scores to the directors’ 
nationality, as obtained from the BoardEx database.6 This implies that we do not examine per 
se the effect of the mix of directors’ actual genes (for which we have no information) on 
corporate performance. Doing so would make this study a biological analysis, which is 
beyond our theoretical motivation in particular or the scope of this research in general. 
Instead, we stress the importance of genetic diversity in the director’s country of origin as a 
means to identify and measure the all-too-many characteristics of the countries that shape 
human behavior and cannot be captured—or are very incompletely captured—by the cultural 
and institutional variables of existing databases. These characteristics are a number of 
sociological, psychological, cultural, and physiological elements that are shaped by or 
correlate with the genetic diversity of the underlying population of the countries considered. 
It is precisely in this manner that we aim to use our genetic diversity related index of board 
heterogeneity. 
 Second, the deviation of diversity disregards whether genetic diversity in the origin 
country is high or low compared with that of the country where the firm is based, which is 
also the country most directors come from. This would be captured by the mean score of 
board diversity, which would then imply that the actual level of the genetic diversity score in 
a board member’s country of origin (the relative homogeneity or heterogeneity of populations 
                                                 
6 A large number of previous studies use nationality from BoardEx to examine the effect of the nationality or the 
nationality mix of the board on corporate performance and executive pay (e.g., Fernandes et al., 2009). All of 
these studies inherently assume that there is a difference between nationality and citizenship. The former is 
referred as the informal membership or identification with a particular nation (not a country or state), with 
nations being understood as social categories, characterized by at least a common language, culture, and 
territory, and sometimes also by a common religious faith and a purportedly shared ancestry. Citizenship is a 
legal status in a political institution, such as a city or a state. The relationship between a citizen and the 
institution that confers this status is formal and, in contemporary liberal-democratic models, includes both a set 
of rights that the citizen possesses by virtue of this relationship and a set of obligations or duties that the citizen 
owes to that institution and his or her fellow citizens in return. 
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in that country) plays a role in determining corporate performance. This outcome is not what 
our theoretical motivation suggests, however. Indeed, there is no reason to assume in social 
sciences that board directors coming from genetically more homogeneous or more 
heterogeneous populations would either positively or negatively affect corporate 
performance. Instead, the deviation of diversity considers only how board members differ 
systematically from each other with respect to the various observable and unobservable 
personal traits reflected in the correlated summary measure of intrapopulation genetic 
diversity. By not examining the homogeneity or heterogeneity of genes and focusing on 
differences we are aligned with what our theoretical considerations suggest when defining 
diversity. In other words, what possibly matters for corporate performance is the inclusion of 
directors with different experiences in the boards, as well as the degree of the differences in 
these experiences. This heterogeneity can be created by adding a director who comes from 
either a country with higher genetic diversity or from a country with lower diversity (or even 
multiple directors from different countries). Thus, in our example, the 10-member board will 
be more heterogeneous, in terms of the genetic diversity in the country of origin of its 
directors, if it has both a British and an Argentinean director.  
 
3.2. Control Variables 
To reduce the omitted-variable bias, we control for a number of variables that might affect 
corporate performance. The first and obvious group of control variables relates to firms’ 
financial characteristics. More specifically, we control for a firm’s sales growth (we also use 
this as dependent variable in some sensitivity tests) and cash flow (e.g., Brush, Bromiley, and 
Hendrickx, 2000), equity capital (Simerly and Li, 2000), liquidity (e.g., Miller and Triana, 
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2009), size (e.g., Dezso and Ross, 2012), and cost inefficiency (e.g., Corbett, Montes-Sancho, 
and Kirsch, 2005). We formally define these variables in Table 1.7 
 A rather important set of controls relates to firms’ foreign expansion, which can be 
correlated with the inclusion of directors from the country or countries into which the firms 
expand internationally. To avoid falsely attributing the effect of the deviation of diversity to 
the performance of a firm’s foreign subsidiaries, we include the growth in foreign sales or the 
share of foreign sales as a percentage of total sales as explanatory variables. Because we lose 
some observations when we include these variables, we decided to use them only in 
robustness checks.  
The second group of variables relates to board attributes, which we discuss in some 
detail to note the differences between these variables and our genetic diversity variable. We 
experiment with many board characteristics available in the BoardEx database, but we resort 
to the ones most commonly used in the studies explaining corporate performance.  
 First, we include standard measures of board composition in terms of gender, 
nationality, independence of audit committee, and financial expertise. Adams and Funk 
(2012) mention that female directors are more benevolent and more universally concerned, 
less power oriented, less tradition and security oriented, and more risk-loving than their male 
counterparts. Unsurprisingly, therefore, other studies document an association between a 
board’s gender composition and a firm’s performance and value (e.g., Adams and Ferreira, 
2009; Dezso and Ross, 2012; Hoogendoorn, Oosterbeek, and van Praag, 2013). To control for 
gender composition, we use the percentage of male directors on the board.  
 The literature also suggests that foreign directors can influence firm performance 
(e.g., Masulis, Wang, and Xie, 2012) and value (e.g., Oxelheim and Randoy, 2003). Thus, we 
                                                 
7 Table A1 presents a correlation matrix that reveals the relationship between the genetic diversity related 
measure of board heterogeneity and the financial characteristics of the firms. The correlation coefficients show 
that our diversity score has a positive and significant correlation with Tobin’s q, but an insignificant correlation 
with the risk-adjusted returns. The diversity score is also strongly positively correlated with firm size, indicating 
that larger firms, perhaps those with a foreign market orientation, have a more diverse board of directors. 
15 
 
control for the proportion of foreign directors on the board. Audit committee independence 
has been associated with firm value (Chan and Li, 2008) and lower debt financing costs 
(Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb, 2004). We therefore control for the proportion of independent 
non-executive directors on the audit committee. Financial experts on the board may provide 
stronger oversight and/or direction with regard to firm financial policies and strategies (Gore, 
Matsunaga, and Yeung, 2011), improve financial reporting monitoring (Kim, Mauldin, and 
Patro, 2014), and enhance external funding and decrease investment cash flow sensitivity 
(Guner, Malmendier, and Tate, 2008). Thus, we control for the proportion of independent 
non-executive directors with past roles on the board as chief financial officer or finance 
director. 
 We also control for five broad characteristics of the board, namely, size, network, 
CEO duality, age, and longevity. The impact of board size, measured by the number of 
directors, has been thoroughly investigated in the literature. On the one hand, from the 
perspective of the resource dependence theory, a large board could provide greater 
information and resources. On the other hand, larger boards could be less effective because of 
coordination problems or director free-riding (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993). 
Social networks and the connectedness of directors may improve access to 
information in terms of cost, quality, relevance, and timeliness (e.g., Adler and Kwon, 2002), 
subsequently enhancing firm performance (Horton, Millo and Serafeim, 2012). Hence, we 
control for the board’s average number of outside linked directors.  
The effect of CEO duality on performance and value has also attracted attention in the 
literature (Rechner and Dalton, 1991; Iyengar and Zampelli, 2009). On the one hand, duality 
violates the idea of separating decision making and control (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 
1993). On the other hand, duality may result in superior leadership in terms of strategy and 
formulation, enhancing stability, confidence in management, and communication among 
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managers and directors (Stoeberl and Sherony, 1985; Iyengar and Zampelli, 2009). 
Therefore, we include a dummy variable indicating whether or not a firm’s CEO is also the 
board chair.  
The directors’ ages may also influence corporate strategy (e.g., R&D spending) and 
performance because of differences in wisdom, energy, risk aversion, and conservatism 
(Wiersema and Bantel, 1992; Muth and Donaldson, 1998; Barker and Mueller, 2002). 
Therefore, we control for the average age of the board of directors. The last board 
characteristic that we consider is longevity, which measures the average time directors have 
spent in their current role. Long tenure and experience enhance a director’s firm-specific 
skills, understanding of group dynamics, and corporate culture (Harris and Helfat, 1997; 
Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy, 2012; Anderson et al., 2011). Yet more time on the board may 
also undermine independence and monitoring (Vafeas, 2003). 
A final group of variables relates to additional characteristics of directors’ origin 
countries. Excluding these characteristics from the regression equations can lead to falsely 
attributing the characteristics’ effects to the board’s genetic diversity. We construct these 
indicators using the same methodology as the genetic diversity variables (i.e., we attach the 
values of the respective variables based on the directors’ nationality and take the standard 
deviation as in equation 1).  
An increasing number of studies document an association between national culture 
and firm outcomes such as capital structure and risk-taking (Li et al., 2011, 2013), debt 
maturity choices (Zheng et al., 2012), and cash holdings (Chang and Noorbakhsh, 2009). To 
control for the effect of a director’s cultural background on corporate performance, we use 
the principal component of Hofstede’s five cultural indicators (power distance, individualism, 
masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, and long term orientation).8 Additionally, we construct a 
                                                 
8 We also experiment with the five cultural indicators separately. The results remain unchanged.  
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board-specific indicator for law and order, which is an indicator widely used to capture the 
quality of legal institutions.9  
Finally, we control for the directors’ orientation in terms of social values (in particular 
trust) and economic, political, and constitutional characteristics.10 For trust, we use 
information from the World Values Survey, and for the economic background, we use GDP 
per capita (in real U.S. dollars). For political and constitutional values in the directors’ 
country of origin, we use data from the Polity IV database to control for political regime 
characteristics. We experiment with many other such variables from a number of data sources 
(e.g., freedom, institutional, and economic variables from the Fraser Institute), and our main 
results remain essentially unaffected. 
 
4. Estimation and Empirical Results 
4.1. Empirical Identification 
We begin by estimating the following model: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎2𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡.       (2) 
In equation (2), y is the corporate performance of firm i in year t, D is our diversity score, X is 
a vector of control variables, and u is the stochastic term. In all of our estimations, we 
separate the stochastic disturbance into a firm fixed effects component, which captures the 
time-invariant characteristics of firms, and the remainder disturbance. The fixed effects are 
                                                 
9 Law and order is perhaps the main institutional factor affecting the corporate environment. We also consider 
other institutional indicators, including bureaucratic quality, corruption, general socioeconomic conditions, and 
so on. These variables are highly correlated with each other, and so to avoid multicollinearity, we include only 
law and order in the regression equations. The legal system in a director’s country of nationality may influence 
firm performance through direct or indirect channels, such as size and breadth of capital markets (La Porta et al., 
1997), firm-level governance (Klapper and Love, 2004), firms’ uses of external financing to fund growth 
(Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998), efficiency (Lensink, Meesters and Naaborg, 2008), and stability 
(Fang, Hasan, and Marton, 2014).  
10 The literature suggests that political rights and institutional structures are associated with firms’ bond yield 
spreads (Qi, Roth, and Wald, 2010), firm growth (Boubakri, Ghoul, and Saffar, 2013), and risk-taking 
(Boubakri, Mansi, and Saffar, 2013). Also, recent studies show that people with different political orientations 
exhibit different preferences in terms of investments (Hong and Kostovetsky, 2012), corporate financial policies 
(Hutton, Jiang, and Kumar, 2014), and so on. 
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eliminated through first differencing. All the estimations also include year fixed effects, 
which capture factors that vary over time in a way that is common to all firms. 
We opt to identify the causal deviation effect on corporate performance. To this end, 
we are concerned with all three main sources of endogeneity problems: reverse causality, 
omitted variables, and measurement error. Reverse causality can arise in our regressions if 
poor performance leads to the decision to diversify the board by injecting directors with a 
different nationality. Further, and despite the use of numerous control variables and firm 
fixed effects, our genetic diversity related index of board heterogeneity may erroneously 
capture other unobserved elements of diversity, thus falsely attributing our findings to genetic 
diversity per se. Finally, given that our measures of diversity are constructed using estimated 
scores, some measurement error may be attached to them.11  
 A joint solution for all these problems is to use one or more instrumental variables 
(IVs) that satisfy the exclusion restriction; that is, we need to identify one or more variables 
that affect genetic diversity but do not affect corporate performance directly. In this sense, an 
excellent proposition for a proper IV comes from Ashraf and Galor (2013a), who use the 
migratory distance (in logs) from East Africa to predict the genetic diversity of countries. In 
our study, the endogenous dependent variable is the standard deviation of the diversity scores 
across board members and, thus, not the diversity score of Ashraf and Galor per se. Thus, we 
can use migratory distance as a means to mitigate both measurement error as well as reverse 
causality and omitted variables biases.  
 With this instrument alone, our equations will be exactly identified, which allows 
receiving under-identification and weak identification tests for the instrument’s validity. To 
                                                 
11 Ashraf and Galor (2013a) recognize that their estimates of the regression of population density on predicted 
genetic diversity can result in biased estimates of the standard errors and, thus, inference due to measurement 
error. To this end, they use a bootstrapping algorithm to consistently estimate standard errors. In our case, we 
have more than one endogeneity problem to address, and thus we resort to an instrumental variable method, 
which inter alia corrects for measurement error in the case where the instrument is uncorrelated with the 
stochastic disturbance (Wooldridge, 2013). 
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receive the results of an over-identification test for our estimated models, we complement 
migratory distance with a measure of ultraviolet (UV) exposure. We also construct this 
variable by firm and year on the basis of equation (1). The intuition in using this variable 
comes from the biology literature. In addition to the apparent and well-known effects of UV 
radiation on skin color, UV radiation can cause mutations of genes, thus affecting alleles 
(e.g., Sturm and Duffy, 2012; Kozmin et al., 2005). Further, differences in UV radiation 
affect the natural landscape with indirect but profound implications for the way humans 
change their lifestyles and form their societies. In turn, there is no reason to believe that UV 
radiation in the board of directors’ origin country would directly affect firms’ performance in 
the country where the firm is headquartered, given that our regressions include firm (and thus 
country) fixed effects. Note that we do confirm our main findings when we only use either 
one of the two instrumental variables separately.  
Note that our IVs are constructed based on the directors’ country of nationality. Thus, 
UV exposure conditions in those countries are unlikely to directly affect corporate 
performance in the countries where the firms are headquartered. Moreover, by using a model 
in first differences, we essentially difference out any such effects common across firms in a 
specific country. Given our estimation method and our control variables, our IVs are unlikely 
to affect corporate performance directly, but they are by definition likely to affect the genetic 
diversity of board members. Thus, these instruments should satisfy the exclusion restriction. 
 Another empirical issue is that corporate performance is persistent, and thus we need 
to estimate a dynamic model to avoid falsely attributing elements of persistence to the 
dynamics of performance. We find that including the first lag of our dependent variable in the 
regression equations is sufficient to accomplish this goal, because the second lag of our 
dependent variables is statistically insignificant. We experiment with both a limited 
information maximum likelihood (LIML) model in first differences, to eliminate the 
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inconsistency arising from including fixed effects, and the standard generalized method of 
moments (GMM) methods of Arellano and Bond (1991) or Blundell and Bond (1998). We 
find that LIML outperforms GMM in all the identification tests and is the favored tool in the 
analysis that follows.12 
  
4.2. The Deviation Effect of Genetic Diversity  
In Table 3, the results show that the effect of the deviation of diversity on risk-adjusted 
returns and Tobin’s q is both positive and statistically significant. In the first four models, the 
dependent variable is risk-adjusted returns, and in the latter four, it is Tobin’s q. Models 1 
and 5 include the baseline controls. In models 2 and 6, we examine additional characteristics 
of the directors’ origin countries, and in models 3 and 7, we add the board characteristics of 
the firms. Finally, in models 4 and 8, which are our preferred specifications, we include only 
the characteristics of the origin countries and board characteristics that have some 
explanatory power in our regressions. All regressions include year fixed effects. We keep the 
number of observations constant for all four pairs of regressions to allow a better comparison 
of the coefficient estimates. In the lower part of the table, we report the under-identification, 
weak identification, and over-identification tests.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 In all cases, the coefficient on the deviation of diversity is positive and statistically 
significant at conventional levels. In both the regressions of risk-adjusted returns and Tobin’s 
q, the economic significance strengthens somewhat as we include additional controls. The 
coefficient on the deviation of diversity in model 4 equals approximately 59 and shows that 
an increase in the deviation of diversity by 0.016 points (equal to a one standard deviation 
                                                 
12 Applying LIML to the model in differences is more rarely used but is a consistent estimator for dynamic panel 
data models (see Baltagi, 2005, pp.153–155), In fact, Alonso-Borrego and Arellano (1999) compare the GMM 
and LIML methods using simulations. Monte Carlo and empirical results show that the GMM can exhibit large 
biases when the instruments are poor, whereas LIML remains essentially unbiased. 
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increase) yields an increase in risk-adjusted returns by approximately 0.94 points. For a firm 
with an average risk-adjusted return (equal to 4.52), this implies a 20.8% increase in risk-
adjusted returns. The results for the effect of the deviation in diversity on Tobin’s q are 
qualitatively similar. Specifically, an increase in the deviation of diversity by 0.016 points 
will increase Tobin’s q by approximately 0.13 points, which is equivalent to 6.9% for a firm 
with an average Tobin’s q in our sample (equal to 1.89).  
 For comparison, we also estimate equation (3) with OLS and OLS on the fixed effects 
model (see Table A2 in the Appendix). These models are robust under the assumption of no 
correlation between the deviation of diversity and the stochastic disturbance. For the simple 
OLS models, we include country dummies to capture any time-invariant country fixed 
effects. None of these models includes a lagged dependent variable because doing so would 
produce inconsistent estimates. The OLS results (models 1 and 3) show a negative and a 
positive effect of the deviation of diversity on the risk-adjusted returns and Tobin’s q, 
respectively. Using firm fixed effects in model 2 changes the sign of the diversity deviation 
effect on the risk-adjusted returns to positive. Thus, the results in models 2 and 4 are in line 
with those of Table 3. In terms of the effect’s economic significance, the coefficient estimates 
in Table A2 are somewhat (but not markedly) smaller. Given especially the issue of 
measurement error associated with the country-specific diversity estimates, we favor the 
results from the IV models. 
 With respect to the financial control variables, our findings are in line with our 
expectations detailed in Section 3.2, as well as with the existing literature. Specifically, more 
capitalized and larger firms have higher risk-adjusted returns, and the equivalent effect of the 
rest of the financial variables is statistically insignificant. The results in Tobin’s q regressions 
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are quite different.13 Sales growth is positively linked with q, but size and inefficiency have a 
negative effect. For inefficiency, this finding is intuitive, but the discrepancy in the results for 
size between the risk-adjusted returns and Tobin’s q further adds to the ambiguity of the role 
of firm size in different aspects of corporate performance. Our results for returns-based 
variables are in line with Richard et al. (2004), while the results for Tobin’s q are in line with 
those of Dushnitsky and Lenox (2006) and Lang and Stulz (1994) in both the sign and 
magnitude of the coefficient. 
 Perhaps the most important set of control variables are the cultural and institutional 
variables that are constructed similarly to the deviation of diversity. These variables are 
important to avoid falsely attributing the effect of the cultural and institutional characteristics 
of the directors’ countries of nationality to genetic diversity. Given that most variables 
examined come out statistically insignificant, in the regression equations we include only five 
of these variables that are theoretically most important: diversity in law and order, political 
diversity, cultural diversity, economic development diversity, and trust diversity. We find that 
the only variable with a significant coefficient is diversity in law and order. In the models on 
risk-adjusted returns, this effect is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, 
suggesting that adding directors from countries with different strength and impartiality of the 
legal system, as well as popular observance of the law, lowers firm value. Most importantly, 
however, adding these or other variables does not diminish the deviation effect of genetic 
diversity, which remains quite strong.  
 In turn, the contribution of the board characteristics to corporate performance is 
relatively minor.14 Time in role bears a statistically significant coefficient in the models on 
risk-adjusted returns, implying that the higher the average number of years a firm director has 
                                                 
13 We exclude the equity capital variable from the Tobin’s q regressions because equity capital is already a 
component of Tobin’s q. 
14 This finding comes as no surprise in light of recent corporate finance studies (e.g., Wintoki, Linck, and Netter, 
2012), which posit that most board characteristics are not strong determinants of corporate performance. 
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held his or her role, the higher the risk-adjusted returns. This result is consistent with Harris 
and Helfat (1997) and Anderson, Reeb, Upadhyay and Zhao (2011), who note that long 
tenure and experience enhance directors’ firm-specific skills, their understanding of group 
dynamics, and corporate culture. In turn, the only marginally significant effect in the Tobin’s 
q equations comes from the chairman’s presence on the board and is negative. This effect is 
in line with the premise that duality violates the idea of the separation of decision making and 
control, and through this mechanism, duality lowers firm value (Fama and Jensen, 1983; 
Jensen, 1993). 
In Table 4, we examine the sensitivity of our estimates when controlling for foreign 
directors, foreign sales growth, and foreign sales in alternative specifications. We do not 
include these variables in our baseline specifications of Table 3 because doing so results in a 
loss of observations. We find that only the effect of foreign directors in model 1 is 
statistically significant, and only at the 10% level. More importantly, the coefficients on the 
deviation of diversity remain statistically significant, and in fact, the coefficients on the 
models of risk-adjusted returns further gain in economic significance. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 In Table 5, we further inquire into the econometric robustness of our results. First, we 
add the squared term of the deviation of diversity to examine the potential existence of a bell-
shaped relationship with corporate performance. This test is in line with the discussion in 
Section 2 that diversity exerts both positive and negative forces on the operational efficiency 
of groups. The coefficients on the main and the squared term in model 1 are jointly 
statistically significant at the 10% level and statistically insignificant in model 2. If we add 
more control variables in model 1, there too the statistical significance diminishes. Thus, we 
cannot find robust evidence for the consistent existence of a bell-shaped relationship between 
the deviation of diversity and corporate performance.  
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[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 In models 3 and 4, we include only migratory distance as an IV, and in models 5 and 
6, we include only ultraviolet exposure. The results remain essentially the same as the 
equivalent measures in Table 3; perhaps the only important difference is that in model 5, the 
coefficient estimate becomes larger. In models 7 and 8, we cluster the standard errors by both 
firm and year. Under this approach, the resulting standard errors are robust to arbitrary 
within-panel autocorrelation (clustering on firms) and to arbitrary contemporaneous cross-
panel correlation (clustering on time). Again, we find that this approach does not affect the 
results. In models 9 and 10, we exclude all firms for which the boards are completely 
homogeneous. The results are essentially unchanged, which is intuitive given that our 
estimations are carried out in first differences. 
 In Table A3 in the appendix, we re-estimate our baseline risk-adjusted returns and 
Tobin’s q models separately for the U.S. and U.K. firms. In the U.S. sample (model 1) the 
effect of the deviation of diversity on the risk-adjusted returns is statistically and 
economically more potent compared to that in the U.K. sample (model 3). However, the 
picture in the Tobin’s q regressions is reversed. Even though the coefficient estimate in the 
U.S. sample (model 2) is larger than the respective in the U.K. sample (model 4), the standard 
error on the deviation of diversity is much lower in the U.K., thus rendering the relevant 
coefficient estimate in model 4 strongly statistically significant.  
 As a final exercise, we examine whether the deviation of diversity affects measures of 
more operational outcomes of the firms. We first differentiate between the revenue and the 
cost side of the firms’ profit function and test whether genetic diversity in the board 
members’ country of origin affects each one separately. In models 1 and 2 of Table 6, we 
report the results on sales growth and operating expenses, respectively. We find that the 
deviation of diversity has a positive effect on sales growth, while its effect on operating 
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expenses is negative but statistically insignificant at conventional levels. These findings are in 
line with important theoretical literature, suggesting that diverse groups bring in more 
creativity and broader perspectives and are less likely to suffer from so-called “groupthink” 
(see, e.g., Watson, Kumar, and Michaelsen, 1993). Further, diverse boards of multinational 
companies are likely to benefit from superior knowledge of foreign markets, institutions, and 
cultural attributes. In turn, all of these elements relate more directly to the revenue side of 
firm performance rather than the cost side, which is more accounting- and process-based.15 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
4.3. Discussion 
The results on the positive effect of the deviation of diversity on corporate performance 
suggest that the theoretical arguments behind the positive forces of board diversity are the 
dominant ones in our sample. The results from including the squared term of the deviation of 
diversity suggest that some ambiguity exists concerning a potential negative effect of genetic 
diversity on returns only for relatively high levels of diversity, but the results do not 
generalize in our sample for either a richer set of controls or for firm value.  
 Our estimations in differences reflect the effect of a firm simply adding one director 
from a country with a different genetic diversity score. By construction, this implies a higher 
score for the deviation of diversity irrespective of whether that director’s country of origin 
has a lower or a higher score relative to the firm’s average. Then, the additional director 
promotes the firm’s genetic diversity, not by bringing in different genes but by bringing in a 
                                                 
15 We also use other response variables, such as elements of risk (e.g., profit volatility, the current ratio, or the 
probability of default from actual information on defaulting firms) and innovation as measured by expenses for 
research and development (R&D) to total assets or sales. We find some preliminary evidence that a higher 
deviation of diversity is associated with lower profit volatility, but we cannot generalize these effects to the 
other measures of risk used. Further, we do not find robust evidence that the deviation of diversity significantly 
explains the level of R&D expenses. Given that the relations between diversity on the one hand and risk and 
innovation on the other have their own theoretical channels that need to be exploited, we do not pursue more 
work in this direction. The preliminary results are available on request. 
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diverse skill set based on the fact that his or her country of origin has relatively higher or 
lower genetic diversity. Thus, we contend that either higher or lower genetic diversity relative 
to the firm’s average is beneficial for firms’ returns and value. 
 These findings are in line with the theoretical propositions of the sociology and 
management literature highlighted in Section 2: A higher level of diversity improves value 
and performance (Blau, 1977; Watson, Kumar, and Michaelsen, 1993; Earley and 
Mosakowski, 2000). These findings are the first to relate elements of genetic diversity to 
corporate performance, and in this sense, our results partially corroborate at the 
microeconomic level those of Ashraf and Galor (2013a) on the effects of genetic diversity on 
countries’ economic development. In other words, we posit that the characteristics of the 
countries of directors’ origins, in terms of genetic diversity, play a special role in determining 
firm performance, and this nexus is above and beyond board heterogeneity in terms of any 
cultural, gender, and institutional characteristics of the directors’ countries of origin.16 Thus, 
the diverse country traits, determined as early as the birth of humanity, can be held 
responsible for the beneficial effect of diversity in the boardroom on firm performance. 
Indeed, our main finding is that the coexistence and synthesis of a large number of these traits 
in the boardroom, associated with multiple directors from different countries, is an important 
determinant of corporate success. 
As mentioned earlier, our study is not intended to examine the board genetic diversity 
based on specific board members’ genes. Doing so would be a purely biological-financial 
analysis, which is beyond the scope of our study. Our premise is that deep-rooted effects 
                                                 
16 Board heterogeneity may be the result of individual attributes (gender, age, time in role, etc.) along with 
other differences in the attributes that characterize the directors’ country of origin (institutional, cultural, etc.). 
Once a number of these other differences have been controlled for in the firm-performance regression models, 
then the unexplained variation in performance is related to the variation in our diversity index, which is a larger 
umbrella encompassing these other differences. In other words, by controlling for as many elements of board 
heterogeneity as possible along with various attributes of the origin countries of board directors, we ensure that 
the deviation effect of genetic diversity does not capture the latent effects of these other country-related 
potential determinants of firm performance. 
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shaped thousands of years ago are common to groups of people who moved away from the 
birthplace of humanity in East Africa and formed today’s modern countries. These 
characteristics, and the associated information they bear, have become genetic in the sense 
that they cannot be captured (or measured) by simple country fixed effects or by other 
cultural and institutional characteristics, which formed in the more recent history of 
humanity. It is these common factors that we find to have an important effect on corporate 
performance. 
Thus, we do not argue that selection of board directors should be determined by 
analyzing potential directors’ genetics. We merely suggest that the recently shaped cultural 
and institutional characteristics in directors’ countries of origin are less important in 
explaining corporate performance than are the deep-rooted factors captured by our diversity 
variable. It is precisely these effects that provide a policy implication, suggesting that 
diversity in the boardroom is desirable. 
 
5. Conclusions and Directions for Future Research 
We construct a firm-year specific measure of corporate boards’ heterogeneity using the 
standard deviation of the genetic diversity in each director’s country of nationality. We 
establish a positive relationship between this measure of board diversity and both a firm’s 
returns and value. We also establish that this type of diversity in the boardroom benefits firms 
in addition to any effect stemming from nationality and other institutional, constitutional, 
social, and behavioral characteristics of the board. 
We link our findings to the established sociology and management literature on firm 
board diversity and to a flourishing economics literature on countries’ genetic diversity. 
Specifically, the positive effect of the deviation of diversity on corporate performance is in 
line with the sociology and management literatures on the advantages of diversity in 
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promoting successful outcomes and shows that increasing board genetic heterogeneity is a 
prerequisite for increasing both corporate returns and value. These results hold when we 
control for board diversity along various other differences in the board members’ country of 
origin like culture, law and order, trust, development, political and constitutional values and 
many others.  
Our findings open up future paths of research in identifying which are the precise 
characteristics captured by our genetic diversity variable. Certainly, this avenue requires 
digging further into the genetic diversity scores and identifying their components. Because 
we have already covered a lot of ground herein, we leave this idea as a desideratum for future 
research. 
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Table 1  
Variable Definitions and Sources 
 
Name 
 
Description 
 
Data source 
 
Dependent variables 
Risk-adjusted returns ROA/σ(ROA). ROA is the average return on assets over a 
three-year period, and σ(ROA) is calculated over the same 
three-year period. 
Worldscope and own 
calculations 
Tobin’s q (Equity market value + Liabilities book value)/(Equity book 
value + Liabilities book value) 
Worldscope 
Sales growth  Net sales/Revenues (1-year annuity) Worldscope 
Operating expenses Total operating expenses/Total sales Worldscope 
   
Explanatory variables   
Deviation of diversity 
𝜎 = √
1
𝑛
∑ (𝑑𝑖 −𝑚)2
𝑛
𝑖=1 , where σ is the standard deviation of 
the genetic diversity score d from the mean value m of the 
diversity of the board of directors, attached to the n board 
directors of each firm, according to the diversity score of the 
country of nationality of each director.  
Ashraf and Galor 
(2013a) and own 
calculations 
Cash flow Cash flow/Total sales Worldscope 
Equity capital Common equity/Total assets Worldscope 
Current ratio Current assets/Current liabilities Worldscope 
Size ln(Total assets) Worldscope 
Inefficiency Cost of goods sold/Total sales Worldscope 
Diversity in law and order The standard deviation of the law and order scores from the 
country of nationality of directors by firm and year, 
constructed in the same way as the deviation of diversity 
variable. 
ICRG and own 
calculations 
Political diversity The standard deviation of the Polity IV index of democracy 
from the country of nationality of directors by firm and year, 
constructed in the same way as the deviation of diversity 
variable. 
Polity IV and own 
calculations 
Cultural diversity The standard deviation of an overall cultural index from the 
five components of the Hofstede database, constructed in the 
same way as the deviation of diversity variable. A principal 
components analysis is used on the five sub-indices to derive a 
single index of cultural diversity. 
Hofstede and own 
calculations 
Diversity in trust The standard deviation of a trust index from the country of 
nationality of directors by firm and year, constructed in the 
same way as the deviation of diversity variable. Average 
scores are calculated based on the samples of respondents 
from the World Values Survey. 
World Values Survey 
and own calculations 
Diversity in development The standard deviation of GDP per capita (in constant U.S. 
prices) from the country of nationality of directors by firm and 
year, constructed in the same way as the deviation of diversity 
variable. 
World Development 
Indicators and own 
calculations 
Number of directors Number of firm directors BoardEx 
Non-executive directors Percentage of non-executive directors on the board BoardEx 
Gender Percentage of male directors on board BoardEx 
Chairman on board Dummy variable equal to one if the executive chairman is 
present on the board and zero otherwise 
BoardEx 
Age of board Average age of the board of directors BoardEx 
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Independent on audit Percentage of independent non-executive directors on the audit 
committee 
BoardEx 
Director network Average of board’s network size, in terms of outside linked 
directors  
BoardEx 
Time in role Average of the number of years of director in current role BoardEx 
Independent past roles Percentage of independent non-executive directors with past 
CFO/FD role on board 
BoardEx 
Foreign directors Percentage of foreign directors on board BoardEx 
Foreign sales growth  Annual growth in foreign sales (in logs) Worldscope 
Foreign sales Foreign sales divided by total sales (%) Worldscope 
   
Instrumental Variables   
Migratory distance ln(Migratory distance from East Africa) Ashraf and Galor 
(2013a) and own 
calculations 
Ultraviolet exposure The intensity of ultraviolet exposure Ashraf and Galor 
(2013a) and own 
calculations 
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Table 2 
Summary Statistics 
The table reports the number of observations as well as the mean, standard deviation, 
minimum, and maximum of the main variables used in the empirical analysis. The variables 
are defined in Table 1. The two panels correspond to the samples used to run regressions 
with risk-adjusted returns and Tobin’s q as the dependent variables, respectively. 
Variable  Observations Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
 
Panel A. Sample with risk-adjusted returns as the dependent variable 
Risk-adjusted returns 4,083 4.52 6.75 -4.61 50.40 
Deviation of diversity 4,083 0.01 0.02 0 0.08 
Cash flow 4,083 10.38 32.29 -818.12 611.40 
Equity capital 4,083 48.21 23.37 -67.68 132.22 
Current ratio 4,083 2.20 2.13 0.28 31.34 
Sales growth  4,083 13.31 28.45 -62.36 340.83 
Size 4,083 13.37 2.10 5.68 19.60 
Inefficiency 4,083 58.70 24.97 0.00 547.78 
Diversity in law and order 4,083 0.10 0.24 0 2.26 
Political diversity 4,083 0.11 0.80 0 27.51 
Cultural diversity 4,083 0.09 1.76 -3.10 12.76 
Diversity in development 4,083 0.07 0.23 0 2.31 
Diversity in trust 4,083 2.70 5.62 0 39.58 
Number of directors 4,083 7.98 2.55 2 20.00 
Non-executive directors 4,083 59.20 21.43 0 100 
Gender 4,083 92.82 9.36 33.33 100.00 
Chairman on board 4,083 0.54 0.50 0 1 
Age of board 4,083 57.79 5.21 38.17 77.75 
Independent on audit 4,083 92.27 20.80 0 100 
Director network 4,083 381.83 310.86 6.60 1,817.64 
Time in role 4,083 6.31 3.39 0.16 23.30 
Independent past roles 4,083 8.26 9.85 0 75 
Foreign directors 4,061 7.35 15.48 0 100 
Foreign sales growth 3,544 100.83 3,384.18 -100 157,789.8 
Foreign sales 3,692 30.87 31.70 0 100 
Migratory distance 4,083 2.47 0.51 1.53 3.13 
Ultraviolet exposure 4,083 4.54 0.39 3.81 5.34 
 
Panel B. Sample with Tobin’s q as the dependent variable 
Tobin’s q 4,198 1.89 1.17 0.56 10.15 
Deviation of diversity 4,198 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.08 
Cash flow 4,198 9.06 38.07 -818.12 611.40 
Equity capital 4,198 48.14 23.08 -67.68 110.16 
Current ratio 4,198 2.20 2.14 0.28 31.34 
Sales growth  4,198 13.53 29.00 -62.61 340.83 
Size 4,198 13.35 2.14 5.68 19.60 
Inefficiency 4,198 58.76 24.95 0.00 547.78 
Diversity in law and order 4,198 0.10 0.23 0 2.26 
Political diversity 4,198 0.11 0.79 0 27.51 
Cultural diversity 4,198 0.08 1.77 -3.10 12.76 
Diversity in development 4,198 0.07 0.23 0 2.31 
Diversity in trust 4,198 2.64 5.54 0 39.58 
Number of directors 4,198 7.98 2.55 2 20.00 
Non-executive directors 4,198 59.11 21.60 0 100 
Gender 4,198 92.83 9.39 33.33 100 
Chairman on board 4,198 0.54 0.50 0 1 
Age of board 4,198 57.75 5.20 38.17 77.75 
Independent on audit 4,198 92.12 21.11 0 100 
Director network 4,198 383.57 312.33 6.60 1,817.64 
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Time in role 4,198 6.28 3.37 0.44 23.30 
Independent past roles 4,198 8.24 9.81 0 75 
Foreign directors 4,176 7.29 15.61 0 100 
Foreign sales growth 3,638 100.13 3,340.67 -100 157,789.8 
Foreign sales 3,783 30.70 31.76 0 100 
Migratory distance 4,198 2.47 0.51 1.53 3.13 
Ultraviolet exposure 4,198 4.54 0.39 3.81 5.34 
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Table 3 
Deviation Effect of Genetic Diversity on Corporate Performance: Baseline Results 
The table reports coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses) of regressions based on equation (2). The dependent variables are 
reported in the first line of the table. All variables are defined in Table 1. Estimation method is LIML in first differences with robust 
standard errors clustered by firm. All models include year fixed effects. UIT is the p-value of the under-identification LM test by 
Kleibergen and Paap, which requires a value lower than 0.05 to reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level. WIT is the Wald F-statistic 
of the weak identification test by Kleibergen and Paap, which must be higher than its critical value (equal to 8.68 in these models) to 
reject the null. OIT is the p-value of the over-identification test by Hansen, which requires a value higher than 0.05 to reject the null 
hypothesis at the 5% level. The ***, **, and * marks denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Dependent variable: Risk-adjusted returns Tobin’s q 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Lagged dependent -0.280*** -0.280*** -0.282*** -0.283*** -0.173*** -0.174*** -0.172*** -0.172*** 
 (-11.149) (-11.160) (-11.184) (-11.187) (-6.182) (-6.216) (-6.124) (-6.164) 
Deviation of diversity 43.912** 50.067** 49.825** 59.023*** 6.794*** 6.799** 7.160** 8.123*** 
 (2.169) (2.342) (2.283) (2.683) (2.711) (2.325) (2.392) (2.841) 
Cash flow -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0,001 
 (-0.228) (-0.193) (-0.201) (-0.462) (0.877) (0.813) (0.807) (0.837) 
Equity capital 0.0026*** 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.026***     
 (2.999) (2.869) (2.796) (2.914)     
Current ratio 0.104 0.106 0.109 0.106 -0.013 -0.013 (0.013) -0,012 
 (0.994) (1.015) (1.042) (1.013) (-1.167) (-1.179) (-1.189) (-1.127) 
Sales growth -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (-0.627) (-0.566) (-0.655) (-0.503) (3.252) (3.270) (3.277) (3.274) 
Size 0.944*** 0.950*** 0.918*** 0.929*** -0.404*** -0.404*** -0.404*** -0.406*** 
 (3.567) (3.626) (3.512) (3.543) (-4.517) (-4.512) (-4.541) (-4.523) 
Inefficiency -0.010 -0.011 -0.010 -0.011 -0.006** -0.006** -0.006** -0.006** 
 (1.249) (-1.331) (-1.294) (-1.349) (-2.230) (-2.278) (-2.232) (-2.256) 
Diversity in law and order  -3.542*** -3.598*** -3.031**  -0.220* -0.209 -0.219* 
  (-2.927) (-2.942) (-2.421)  (-1.681) (-1.616) (-1.840) 
Political diversity  -0.069 -0.063   -0.015 -0.015  
  (-0.470) (-0.444)   (-1.314) (-1.316)  
Cultural diversity  0.312 0.288   0.037 0.038  
  (0.846) (0.786)   (1.065) (1.095)  
Diversity in development  1.540 1.367   -0.120 -0.127  
  (0.768) (0.689)   (-1.049) (-1.105)  
Diversity in trust  -0.047 -0.043   0.005 0.005  
  (-1.000) (-0.931)   (0.962) (0.913)  
Number of directors   0.181    -0.013  
   (1.609)    (-1.164)  
Non-executive directors   -0.012    -0.000  
   (-0.712)    (-0.080)  
Gender   0.010    0.003  
   (0.343)    (0.841)  
Chairman on board   0.177 0.172   -0.091* -0.090 
   (0.367) (0.360)   (-1.620) (-1.600) 
Age of board   -0.073    -0.002  
   (-1.002)    (-0.161)  
Independent on audit   0.009    0.002  
   (1.000)    (1.332)  
Network size   0.001    -0.000  
   (0.761)    (-0.082)  
Time in role   0.164** 0.139*   0.004 0.004 
   (2.124) (1.888)   (0.385) (0.458) 
Independent past roles   -0.024    0.001  
   (-1.196)    (0.373)  
Observations 4,083 4,083 4,083 4,083 4,198 4,198 4,198 4,198 
UIT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
WIT 76.37  78.82 79.23 64.90 81.06 84.48 84.17 68.90 
OIT 0.54 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.61 0.50 0.38 0.60 
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Table 4 
Controlling for Foreign Sales and Foreign Directors 
The table reports coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses) of regressions based on equation (2). The dependent 
variables are reported in the first line of the table. All variables are defined in Table 1. Estimation method is LIML in first 
differences with robust standard errors clustered by firm. All models include year fixed effects. UIT is the p-value of the 
under-identification LM test by Kleibergen and Paap, which requires a value lower than 0.05 to reject the null hypothesis at 
the 5% level. WIT is the Wald F-statistic of the weak identification test by Kleibergen and Paap, which must be higher than 
its critical value (equal to 8.68 in these models) to reject the null. OIT is the p-value of the over-identification test by Hansen, 
which requires a value higher than 0.05 to reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level. The ***, **, and * marks denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Dependent variable: 
1 
Risk-adjusted 
returns 
2 
Tobin’s q 
3 
Risk-adjusted 
returns 
4 
Tobin’s q 
 
5 
Risk-adjusted 
returns 
6 
Tobin’s q 
 
Lagged dependent -0.283*** -0.173*** -0.287*** -0.182*** -0.274*** -0.175*** 
 (-11.160) (-6.177) (-10.298) (-6.079) (-9.768) (-5.976) 
Deviation of diversity 96.748** 12.896** 73.338*** 6.213** 67.493*** 7.272*** 
 (2.475) (2.232) (2.955) (2.192) (2.948) (2.698) 
Cash flow -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 
 (-0.469) (0.853) (-0.553) (1.413) (-0.556) (0.882) 
Equity capital 0.026***  0.028***  0.027***  
 (2.912)  (2.693)  (2.679)  
Current ratio 0.106 -0.012 0.153 -0.019 0.136 -0.018 
 (1.008) (-1.079) (1.298) (-1.576) (1.183) (-1.569) 
Sales growth -0.001 0.002*** -0.001 0.002** -0.001 0.002*** 
 (-0.491) (3.065) (-0.536) (2.475) (-0.378) (2.607) 
Size 0.902*** -0.388*** 0.884*** -0.417*** 0.960*** -0.398*** 
 (3.380) (-4.397) (2.752) (-3.972) (3.318) (-4.292) 
Inefficiency -0.010 -0.006** -0.013 -0.006** -0.012 -0.006** 
 (-1.297) (-2.225) (-1.368) (-2.344) (-1.319) (-2.352) 
Foreign directors -0.082* -0.009     
 (-1.917) (-1.313)     
Foreign sales growth   -0.000 0.000   
   (-1.404) (0.303)   
Foreign sales     -0.012 -0.002 
     (-1.155) (-1.621) 
Diversity in law and order -2.480* -0.182 -2.983** -0.171 -3.040** -0.193 
 (-1.937) (-1.484) (-2.122) (-1.393) (-2.228) (-1.610) 
Chairman on board 0.123 -0.116** -0.073 -0.107* 0.151 -0.110* 
 (0.256) (-2.160) (-0.133) (-1.675) (0.277) (-1.797) 
Time in role 0.133* 0.004 0.134* 0.002 0.138* 0.005 
 (1.794) (0.445) (1.675) (0.266) (1.792) (0.555) 
Observations 4,061 4,176 3,356 3,444 3,560 3,658 
UIT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
WIT 23.53 24.18 56.18 58.74 63.70 67.92 
OIT 0.06 0.22 0.13 0.27 0.13 0.58 
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Table 5 
Non-Linearity, Different Instrumental Variables and Two-Way Clustering of Standard Errors 
The table reports coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses) of regressions based on equation (2). The dependent variables are 
reported in the first line of the table. All variables are defined in Table 1. Estimation method is LIML in first differences with robust 
standard errors clustered by firm in models 1 to 6 and by both firms and years in models 7 and 8. All models include year fixed effects. In 
models 3 and 4 the instrumental variable is only migratory distance and in models 5 and 6 only ultraviolet exposure. UIT is the p-value of 
the under-identification LM test by Kleibergen and Paap, which requires a value lower than 0.05 to reject the null hypothesis at the 5% 
level. WIT is the Wald F-statistic of the weak identification test by Kleibergen and Paap, which must be higher than its critical value 
included in parentheses to reject the null. OIT is the p-value of the over-identification test by Hansen, which requires a value higher than 
0.05 to reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level. The ***, **, and * marks denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
Dependent variable: 
 
1 
Risk-
adjusted 
returns 
2 
Tobin’s q 
3 
Risk-
adjusted 
returns 
4 
Tobin’s q 
 
 
5 
Risk-
adjusted 
returns 
6 
Tobin’s q 
 
 
7 
Risk-
adjusted 
returns 
8 
Tobin’s q 
Lagged dependent -0.282*** -0.172*** -0.283*** -0.172*** -0.282*** -0.172*** -0.283*** -0.172*** 
 (-11.013) (-6.159) (-11.189) (-6.165) (-11.167) (-6.162) (-9.882) (-4.196) 
Deviation of diversity 607.173 19.672 52.939** 7.980*** 99.872*** 9.013*** 59.023*** 8.123*** 
 (1.577) (0.865) (2.401) (2.787) (2.763) (2.681) (3.246) (3.481) 
Deviation of diversity 
squared 
12,200.0 -258.8       
(-1.425) (-0.512)       
Cash flow 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0,001 
 (-0.195) (0.844) (-0.446) (0.838) (-0.573) (0.833) (-0.515) (1.215) 
Equity capital 0.025***  0.026***  0.025***  0.026***  
 (2.846)  (2.917)  (2.893)  (3.742)  
Current ratio 0.089 -0.013 0.106 -0.012 0.104 -0.012 0.106 -0.012 
 (0.833) (-1.148) (1.015) (-1.127) (0.999) (-1.128) (1.016) (-1.356) 
Sales growth -0.001 0.002*** -0.001 0.002*** -0.001 0.002*** -0.001 0.002** 
 (-0.491) (3.261) (-0.513) (3.274) (-0.436) (3.2770 (-0.501) (2.404) 
Size 0.905*** 0.405*** 0.930*** -0.406*** 0.922*** -0.406*** 0.929** -0.406*** 
 (3.262) (-4.515) (3.547) (-4.523) (3.507) (-4.520) (2.079) (-2.922) 
Inefficiency -0.009 -0.006** -0.011 -0.006** -0.011 -0.006** -0.011 -0.006*** 
 (-1.131) (-2.241) (-1.344) (-2.256) (-1.381) (-2.255) (-1.292) (-2.850) 
Diversity in law and order -4.845*** -0.257* -2.907** -0.217* -3.860*** -0.237* -3.031** -0.219 
 (-3.034) (-1.685) (-2.284) (-1.834) (-3.117) (-1.804) (-2.499) (-1.566) 
Chairman on board 0.159 -0.090 0.172 -0.090 0.169 -0.090 0.172 -0.090*** 
 (0.331) (-1.605) (0.361) (-1.600) (0.355) (-1.604) (0.489) (-2.784) 
Time in role 0.181** 0.005 0.138* 0.004 0.146** 0.004 0.139** 0.004 
 (2.267) (0.549) (1.873) (0.455) (1.982) (0.476) (2.029) (0.408) 
Observations 4,083 4,198 4,083 4,198 4,083 4,198 4,083 4,198 
UIT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
WIT 
 
6.17   
(7.03) 
6.92 
(7.03) 
133.11 
(16.38) 
142.09 
(16.38) 
79.53 
(16.38) 
74.99 
(16.38) 
140.24 
(8.68) 
131.31 
(8.68) 
OIT - - - - - - - - 
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Table 6 
Operational Outcomes of the Deviation Effect of Genetic 
Diversity 
The table reports coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in 
parentheses) of regressions based on equation (2). The 
dependent variables are reported in the first line of the table. All 
variables are defined in Table 1. Estimation method is LIML in 
first differences with robust standard errors clustered by firm. 
All models include year fixed effects. UIT is the p-value of the 
under-identification LM test by Kleibergen and Paap, which 
requires a value lower than 0.05 to reject the null hypothesis at 
the 5% level. WIT is the Wald F-statistic of the weak 
identification test by Kleibergen and Paap, which must be 
higher than its critical value included in parentheses to reject the 
null. OIT is the p-value of the over-identification test by 
Hansen, which requires a value higher than 0.05 to reject the 
null hypothesis at the 5% level. The ***, **, and * marks denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
Dependent variable: 
1 
Sales growth 
 
2 
Operating 
expenses 
Lagged dependent -0.108*** -0.283 
 (-4.819) (-1.024) 
Deviation of diversity 477.825** -349.789 
 (2.136) (-1.081) 
Cash flow -0.008 0.142 
 (-0.353) (0.328) 
Equity capital -0.053 -0.301 
 (-1.090) (-0.936) 
Current ratio -0.693 -3.080 
 (-0.906) (-0.766) 
Sales growth -0.108*** -0.500 
 (-4.819) (-0.970) 
Size -80.737*** 54.188 
 (-19.832) (0.860) 
Inefficiency 0.079 -3.635 
 (0.928) (-0.991) 
Observations 4,363 4,381 
UIT 0.00 0.00 
WIT 79.88 83.49 
OIT 0.07 0.55 
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Table A1 
Correlation matrix 
This table reports correlation coefficients of the firm-level variables used in equations 1 and 5 of Table 3. All variables are defined in Table 1. The *** 
marks denote statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 
Risk-adjusted 
returns 
Tobin’s q 
 
Deviation of 
diversity 
Cash flow 
 
Equity 
capital 
Current 
ratio 
Sales 
growth 
Size 
 
Inefficiency 
 
Risk-adjusted returns 1.000         
Tobin’s q 0.139*** 1.000        
Deviation of diversity -0.010 0.063*** 1.000       
Cash flow 0.126*** 0.012 0.059*** 1.000      
Equity capital 0.000 0.152*** -0.071*** 0.014 1.000     
Current ratio -0.057*** 0.171*** -0.025 -0.090*** 0.547*** 1.000    
Sales growth 0.009 0.137*** -0.002 0.085*** 0.058*** 0.005 1.000   
Size 0.230*** -0.030* 0.251*** 0.193*** -0.358*** -0.291*** -0.061*** 1.000  
Inefficiency -0.041** -0.290*** -0.016 -0.183*** -0.285*** -0.214*** -0.071*** 0.190*** 1.000 
 
  
46 
 
 
Table A2 
OLS results 
The table reports coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses) of regressions based 
on equation (2). The dependent variables are reported in the first line of the table. All 
variables are defined in Table 1. The estimation method is OLS with robust standard errors 
clustered by firm. All models include year fixed effects. Models 1 and 3 include country 
fixed effects, and models 2 and 4 include firm fixed effects. UIT is the p-value of the under-
identification LM test by Kleibergen and Paap, which requires a value lower than 0.05 to 
reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level. WIT is the Wald F-statistic of the weak 
identification test by Kleibergen and Paap, which must be higher than its critical value 
included in parentheses to reject the null. OIT is the p-value of the over-identification test by 
Hansen, which requires a value higher than 0.05 to reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level. 
The ***, **, and * marks denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
Dependent variable: Risk-adjusted returns Tobin’s q 
 1 2 3 4 
Deviation of diversity -23.879** 33.800* 5.770** 4.062** 
 (-2.114) (1.725) (2.372) (2.275) 
Cash flow 0.016*** 0.007* -0.001 -0.001 
 (3.513) (1.697) (-1.033) (-1.128) 
Equity capital 0.022*** 0.029**   
 (2.742) (2.345)   
Current ratio -0.086 0.053 0.044** -0.001 
 (-1.042) (0.468) (2.206) (-0.084) 
Sales growth 0.004 0.006** 0.005*** 0.002*** 
 (1.201) (2.193) (5.012) (3.553) 
Size 0.921*** 0.486 -0.004 -0.068*** 
 (9.449) (1.352) (-0.201) (-3.448) 
Inefficiency -0.017*** -0.018 -0.011*** -0.007*** 
 (-2.658) (-1.361) (-5.672) (-6.054) 
Diversity in law and order -0.851 -2.357** 0.153 0.001 
 (-1.219) (-2.362) (1.084) (0.015) 
Chairman on board 0.232 0.187 -0.075 -0.065 
 (0.703) (0.314) (-1.093) (-1.319) 
Time in role 0.279*** 0.088 0.006 0.01 
 (5.319) (0.977) (0.642) (1.305) 
Firm fixed effects No Yes No Yes 
Observations 4,083 4,083 4,198 4,198 
R-squared 0.11 0.10 0.17 0.14 
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Table A3 
Results for the United States and the United Kingdom 
The table reports coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses) of regressions based on 
equation (2). The dependent variables are reported in the first line of the table. All variables 
are defined in Table 1. The estimation method is LIML in first differences with robust 
standard errors clustered by firm. UIT is the p-value of the under-identification LM test by 
Kleibergen and Paap, which requires a value lower than 0.05 to reject the null hypothesis at 
the 5% level. WIT is the Wald F-statistic of the weak identification test by Kleibergen and 
Paap, which must be higher than its critical value (equal to 8.68 in these models) to reject the 
null. OIT is the p-value of the over-identification test by Hansen, which requires a value 
higher than 0.05 to reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level. 
 United States United Kingdom 
Dependent variable: 
1 
Risk-
adjusted 
returns  
2 
Tobin’s q 
 
 
3 
Risk-
adjusted 
returns  
4 
Tobin’s q 
 
 
Lagged dependent -0.253*** -0.166*** -0.324*** -0.131*** 
 (-7.643) (-4.955) (-8.760) (-2.811) 
Deviation of diversity 79.980** 7.909 21.201 4.277** 
 (2.040) (1.373) (1.420) (2.446) 
Cash flow -0.002 0.000 0.003 0.000 
 (-0.679) (0.700) (1.561) (0.482) 
Equity capital 0.029** -0.006** 0.020* -0.005** 
 (2.065) (-2.163) (1.865) (-2.432) 
Current ratio 0.083 -0.017 0.142 0.010 
 (0.512) (-1.065) (1.143) (0.852) 
Sales growth -0.009*** 0.002** 0.003 0.002*** 
 (-3.536) (2.209) (1.087) (2.872) 
Size 2.155*** -0.580*** 0.532* -0.326*** 
 (4.658) (-3.883) (1.841) (-4.175) 
Inefficiency -0.006 -0.008** -0.018** -0.001 
 (-0.565) (-2.148) (-2.128) (-0.647) 
Observations 2,221 2,179 1,799 1,754 
UIT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
WIT 19.83 19.76 97.12 93.90 
OIT 0.07 0.11 0.63 0.12 
 
 
